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I. INTRODUCTION
The industries and infrastructure supporting an era of ubiquitous and
relatively low cost communication came of age in the twentieth century.
For nearly two-thirds of that century, the regulatory framework governing
the communication industries was set by the Communications Act of 1934
("1934 Act"). The framework for regulation created by the 1934 Act
reflected both the early United States experience with the telephone and
broadcast technologies of that era and the prevailing regulatory philosophy
of the time, which viewed government as a corrective for the failures of
communication markets prone to monopolization.' By the early 1980s, as
the 1934 Act was approaching its half-century mark, there was increasing
sentiment that the regulatory apparatus created by the 1934 Act had
become more of a hindrance than a help to continued progress in the
communications sector. Cable television had developed into a potent
challenger to incumbent broadcast interests; MCI, Sprint, and other carriers
were offering credible substitutes for AT&T's long-distance service, and it
was widely anticipated that trends in communication technologies would
make it possible to rely on competition, rather than regulatory oversight, to
govern an increasing swath of the communications sector. By the early
1990s, the prevailing sentiment was that competition could more efficiently
discipline the pricing and quality of communication services than could
government using the regulatory apparatus erected under the 1934 Act and
that competitive communication markets would develop naturally if market
forces were given freer reign.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") was a reflection
of this mindset and was widely heralded for ushering in a new era of
competition in communications. Yet, only ten years after its passage, the
1996 Act is commonly seen as broken and in need of either wholesale
revision or complete replacement. In contemplating new legislation, it is
appropriate to ask what accounts for its notable lack of staying power
compared to the 1934 Act. Because the 1996 Act is a complex piece of
legislation, there are undoubtedly many details, which, had they been
handled differently, could have contributed to a more satisfactory
experience under the 1996 Act. In this regard, it is doubtful the 1996 Act is
different from any other similarly complex piece of legislation. The
numerous court challenges and policy revisions in the wake of the 1996
Act could be seen as an inevitable part of a period of reassessment and
adjustment as legislation intended to transform a whole sector of an
economy is implemented. However, the present disenchantment with the
1. Gerald W. Brock, THE SECOND INFORMATION REVOLUTION 14-15 (2003)
[hereinafter INFORMATION REVOLUTION].
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1996 Act reflects frustration over a lack of progress in designing even the
interim policies that were to smooth the transition to more competitive
markets for traditional communication industries-and presumably a post-
interim regulatory framework compatible with competitive markets. This
disenchantment is also based in a growing sense that the continued
evolution of communication technologies and the services built on those
technologies have raised a host of policy issues that were not anticipated by
the 1996 Act. However, we will argue in this Essay that these are but
visible signs of three fundamental challenges of policymaking in industries
subject to rapid technological and economic change. First, 'due to the large
number .of interacting factors and the associated incomplete information
issues, it may not be possible to identify a policy model that links policy
instruments with specific policy outcomes. As policies are implemented,
they nearly always generate unanticipated consequences. Second, even if
problems of incomplete information and uncertainty can be overcome, as
the number of stakeholders increases, it becomes more and more difficult
to find a solution that is politically feasible and will not be challenged by
individual organizations or coalitions of organizations. Third, even if such
a model and the associated instruments can be identified, it may not be
robust to further changes in industry conditions.
This Essay addresses all three of these issues and possible ways to
overcome them more effectively in the future. The next Part briefly
discusses the co-evolution of law, technology, and sector organization,
comparing changes in communication technologies and industries since
1996 to the changes that occurred during the sixty-two years when the 1934
Act held sway. It illustrates that the most recent pace of technical,
economic, and policy change has been self-reinforcing and of a character
that could not have been predicted when the 1996 Act was passed. In the
following Part, we argue that the difficulties and failures observed to date
in designing policies compatible with increased competition in traditional
communication industries reflect in substantial part a misplaced belief at
the time of the 1996 Act that our understanding of the economics and
politics of communications policy justified confident claims as to how
competition would develop and work in communication markets and how
tradeoffs between economic and noneconomic goals for communications
policy might be addressed as competitive forces were given greater sway.
To illustrate the incompleteness of the understanding of the economics of
communication markets, we briefly recount the highlights of the history of
FCC attempts to design rules for network unbundling. A review of the
FCC's failed attempt to create a diversity index that would provide an
empirical foundation for attempts to balance traditional diversity goals for
media policy against societal interests in economic efficiency in media
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markets illustrates how poorly the conceptual foundations for developing
policy in this area are formed. The final Part draws on the observations of
the previous two Parts to offer suggestions for how the process of crafting
future communications legislation might be improved.
II. THE CO-EVOLUTION OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY, SECTOR
ORGANIZATION, AND PERFORMANCE
The design of law and policy is typically conceptualized as an
optimization problem subject to certain technological, economic, and
institutional constraints. At the heart of the traditional policy analysis
approach is the assumption that societal preferences can be expressed in an
objective function: W=W(x). Following the notation of Thrainn
Eggertsson, policy model x=fta, z) specifies empirical relations between a
vector of policy instruments a, which are elements of a larger set of policy
variables A (aE A) and vectors of outcomes x and external variables z.
Analytical or computational methods are needed to determine policy
instruments that maximize the objective function W(x*). If X, is the set of
possible outcomes given the external factors z, the goal of public policy is
to find the values for the policy variables a*=g(x*, z), generating outcomes
x* that maximize the objective function (i.e., W*=W(x*)). The traditional
view also assumes a clear division of labor between policymakers, who
determine W(x) and experts, who reveal the relevant theoretical and
empirical relations fta, z) and assist in the choice of the optimal policy
instrument(s).
Although its execution faces many challenges, this view is justifiable
in the short run. Determination of the policy objectives and their weights
(the welfare function) is not a trivial problem and is often done implicitly
rather than in an open dialogue. Under conditions of incomplete
information and uncertainty, it may not be possible to establish a robust
policy model. Moreover, it may not be possible to fine tune policy
instruments to achieve particular outcomes, especially if time lags exist
between the adoption of measures and their effects. Furthermore, political
and economic constraints will typically limit the set of feasible policy
choices. According to Barbara Cherry, policies are sustainable if the
measures are politically adoptable and perform reasonably well with
respect to the stated goals. Thus, policies are sustainable if the
2. Thrainn Eggertsson, Limits to Institutional Reform, 100 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF ECON.,
335-57 (1998).
3. See Barbara A. Cherry, Addressing Political Feasibility As Well As Economic
Viability Constraints to Achieve Sustainable Telecommunications Policies in the U.S.,
Paper Presented at the 31st Research Conference on Communication, Information and
Internet Policy (2003), http://tprc.org/papers/2003/198/CherryTPRC2003.pdf.
[Vol. 58
Number 3] REWRITE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
technological, economic, and political forces of change are weaker than the
forces favoring preservation of the existing arrangements. It is possible that
no such policies exist, for example, because no sufficient policy instrument
is known or no politically feasible solution exists. In these cases the set of
sustainable policies is empty, and one would expect continuing policy
change.
In the medium and long run the predominant policy approach ignores
that policies, in addition to the incentives of decision makers, also have
feedback effects on the constraints-and thus modify the initial policy
problem. In the long run it is therefore more appropriate to view law and
policy, technology, sector organization, and sector performance as
coevolving, each shaping but not fully determining the other.4 For example,
unbundling rules will affect the investment decisions of the firms bound by
these rules and those benefiting from them. Good policy decisions ideally
would be based on dynamic models that capture direct short-term and
indirect long-term effects of policy instruments. Extending the definition of
sustainability, policies can be considered "dynamically sustainable" as long
as the existing policy process can adapt existing measures to changing
circumstances.
Like other areas of public policy, telecommunications policy is
embedded in multiple layers of social arrangements, such as constitutional
provisions, statutory provisions, and specific regulatory institutions, to
which dynamic sustainability can refer respectively. Dynamic sustainability
thus refers to policy at a meta-level, the legal and institutional
arrangements of policy, rather than specific instruments. The current debate
on rewriting the 1996 Act refers to both notions of sustainability:
modifications in specific regulatory instruments and a possible redesign of
the overall arrangements guiding the sector.
This framework can also explain the different staying powers of the
1934 and the 1996 Acts and the difficulties of enacting radical changes in
existing laws. To keep the subject manageable, in the following discussion
of the changes in technologies and industries regulated by the FCC under
the 1934 Act, we will restrict our attention to telephony and radio and
4. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of co-evolution as applied to
telecommunication policy, see Barbara A. Cherry and Johannes M. Bauer, Adaptive
Regulation: Contours of a Policy-Model for the Internet Economy, Address at the 15th
Biennial Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (Sept. 15, 2004),
http://www.quello.msu.edu/wp/wp-04-05.pdf; See also Barbara A. Cherry, The
Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as Coevolving Complex Adaptive Systems:
Implications for Federalism, Paper Presented at the 32nd Research Conference on
Communication, Information and Internet Policy (2004), http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/
papers/2004/318/ChenyTPRCO4.pdf.
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television services. The 1934 Act can be seen as a sustainable policy given
the specific circumstances at the time of its promulgation and the fact that
the technological advances of the immediately ensuing decades could
easily be accommodated within the regulatory framework that the 1934 Act
established.
In 1934, telephone calls were transmitted exclusively via copper wires
and routed by a system relying on a combination of manual and mechanical
switches. The commercial radio industry was less than halfway into its
second decade, and inventors were still experimenting with a nascent
television technology. While there were a number of heralded advances in
telephone technology over the next four decades, including electronic
switching, improved multiplexing and hence capacity utilization, for the
most part these advances improved the efficiency of the existing network,
which was engineered to achieve high economies of scale. Within the
purview of the common carrier provisions of the 1934 Act, federal and
state regulators adapted the border between monopolistic regulated and
nonregulated market segments in response to technical and economic
change and user demands.
The breakup of AT&T in 1984 continued this process at an
accelerated pace. Digitization dramatically increased processing power and
transmission capacity. The rapid growth of wireless communications
further destabilized the structural model established by divestiture. The
1996 Act codified the regulatory changes that had been made until then and
set out to establish the conditions for competition in the local loop. It thus
declared competition the law of the land. By the mid 1990s, the number of
stakeholders had grown substantially, rendering it much more difficult to
find sustainable policy solutions. Whereas the 1996 Act did reduce cross-
entry barriers, it retained by and large the "silo" approach of different legal
rules for broadcasting, common carriers, cable television, and information
service providers. Its asymmetric design-placing much higher regulatory
burdens on ILECs than on CLECs, largely independent of an actual
assessment of the specific competitive situations-created further
incentives for stakeholders to challenge its provisions. Further
technological and economic change, such as the emergence of the Internet
and Internet Protocol ("IP") networking in general, continued to challenge
some of the basic legal premises of the 1996 Act. Whereas the original
networks located the intelligence at the center of the network, in IP
networks, intelligence migrated to the edges of the network, making
services such as VoIP and softswitching much easier to configure.
The story for the broadcast industries is similar in its basic outlines to
that of telephony. Television joined radio as a second broadcast industry in
the 1940s and the spectrum devoted to broadcast radio services was
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expanded with the addition of the FM band, which did not achieve
competitive parity with AM services until the 1970s. Popular radio
program formats, including comedies, dramas, variety programs, and soap
operas quickly migrated to television and radio adapted to a new niche as a
provider of music and talk programming. The number of stations continued
to grow with the growing population and wealth of the country. While
these changes within the broadcast industry were significant, profits were
growing as well and none were a threat to the stability of the existing
system.
Cable television, which emerged as a new provider of television
services in the 1950s, initially functioned mainly as a retransmission
service that imported the signals of distant broadcasters into regions too
sparsely populated to support commercial television services. Its role
became more competitive to that of broadcasters as cable providers began
first to import distant signals into markets with incumbent broadcasters and
then to supply cable-originated programming. However, whatever threat
cable might have presented to broadcasters was effectively suppressed by
FCC regulations that severely restricted cable operators' choices in
selecting imported signals. These regulations were justified in part by a
belief that cable was a threat to the struggling UHF television stations that
the Commission hoped would eventually develop into significant
competitors to the limited numbers of VHF stations licensed to serve
television markets.
The FCC began to roll back its restrictions on cable television starting
in the mid-1970s and Congress substantially deregulated the cable industry
with the Cable Act of 1984. The cable industry responded with a
proliferation of new cable networks that began steadily taking audience
share from broadcasters. Competition from the increasingly popular cable
services has been one of the justifications offered for progressive relaxation
of broadcast ownership restrictions beginning in the mid-1980s. Direct
broadcast satellite ("DBS") services emerged as a second new technology
to challenge broadcasters in the mid-1990s, but only after considerable
delay due to the need to secure regulatory approval. As cable-like
programming services, they could also be accommodated with modest
modifications to the existing regulatory framework.
The framers of the 1996 Act responded to these developments by
loosening ownership restrictions for both radio and television and by
requiring the FCC to periodically review its ownership regulations to
ensure that they were not unduly restrictive. The FCC's attempts to revise
its ownership policies have floundered in the courts. However, as
opponents have successfully argued, the arguments and evidence offered
by the Commission on behalf of its proposals was insufficient, especially
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
when it came to achieving a balance between the economic goals and the
noneconomic diversity goals of media policy. The most recent and notable
setback for the Commission's diversity policies occurred in June 2004
when the Third Circuit, ruling on Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC,
5
remanded to the Commission substantial portions of its July 2, 2003 Report
and Order on media ownership ("2003 Report and Order"),6 including its
proposed diversity index, which was to serve as a gauge of the
consequences of media concentration for the media's contributions to
viewpoint diversity. Among other things, the Third Circuit found the
Commission erred by giving Internet sources too much weight in the index
because the Internet sources of local news identified by the Commission
consisted mostly of Web sites maintained by local newspapers and
television stations. This situation could change, of course, with the
development of Internet news services providing content that does not
originate from broadcasting and newspaper organizations.
The difficulties we are experiencing trying to fashion new media
policies appropriate to a new media environment are almost certain to
intensify. At the time the 1996 Act was written and passed, the commercial
Internet was still a largely nascent phenomenon and the elements of the
1996 Act directly affecting broadcasting largely reflected the developments
in television and radio services outlined above. Since that time, and
especially with growing broadband penetration, the Internet has emerged as
the hub of a rapidly restructuring news and entertainment sector. Audio and
video downloads and streaming services are growing as both new
distribution windows for established content providers and as competitors
to established providers. At the same time, telephone companies have
seized on Internet Protocol television ("IPTV") as a vehicle for entering the
market for pay television services.
From a co-evolutionary perspective, the 1934 Act had staying power
because the conditions for sustainability were more easily met. Until the
early 1980s, there was a broadly shared vision of the structure and future
development of the telecommunications industry and the most appropriate
policy framework for it. Revisions such as the Cable Act of 1984 may be
seen as dynamic adaptations to technological, economic, and political
changes within this accepted overarching setting. The changes introduced
during the 1970s and 1980s unleashed powerful forces of transformation,
eventually undermining the sustainability of the existing framework. A
5. Prometheus Radio Project v. F.C.C., 373 F.3d 372 (3rd Cir. 2004).
6. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
18 F.C.C.R. 13620 (2003).
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more wholesale rewrite was gradually seen as inevitable and garnered the
support necessary to become politically feasible. A conceptual model of
telecommunications, in which supply- and demand-side changes facilitated
ubiquitous competition, was widely adopted.7 Its conceptual weaknesses
were rarely questioned and only revealed much later as the effects of
policies based on the 1996 Act became observable. Furthermore, by the
early 1990s, the number of stakeholders with conflicting interests had
multiplied. Thus in order to pass the 1996 Act--designed as a major reform
but not wholesale rewrite-many political compromises had to be
accepted. The legal and regulatory status quo ante, such as common
carriage principles, embedded in century-old case law, imposed further
constraints on the set of feasible solutions. 10
In hindsight, the specific legislative choices and the regulatory
policies rooted in them---most importantly, the asymmetric treatment of
players; the continuation of separate regulatory models for different
industry segments; and the pursuit of relatively vague, though traditional,
social goals while promoting competition in rapidly growing markets-
constituted an unsustainable policy model. This was compounded by the
continued technological and economic transformation of the
communication industries. The U.S. legal and institutional framework
offers many avenues to challenge laws and regulations, all of which were
pursued by stakeholders. From this perspective, the prolonged period of
policy changes can be seen as responses to correct some of the
unsustainable features of the 1996 Act. Under conditions as complicated as
those in telecommunications, such a piecemeal approach may be the only
way forward. On the other hand, as is known from the theory of large
technical systems, there is no guarantee that such an approach will actually
achieve a local, let alone a global, policy optimum. From this perspective,
the task for any redesign of communications law is seen in a different light:
to create a framework that supports static and dynamic sustainability
without losing sight of the traditional goals of communications policy.
Before we address possible ways forward, we will briefly review two areas
of policy to illustrate the arguments presented in this Part.
7. See INFORMATION REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 16-20.
8. See, e.g., Harry M. Trebing, Telecommunications Regulation: The Continuing
Dilemma, in PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 93 (Kenneth Nowotny et al. eds., 1989) (on file
with Authors).
9. See, e.g., Patricia Aufderheide, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(1999).
10. See Barbara A. Cherry, The Political Realities of Telecommunications Policies in
the U.S.: How the Legacy of Public Utility Regulation Constrains Adoption of New
Regulatory Models, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REv. 757.
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III. THE INCOMPLETE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR
REGULATORY REFORM
As discussed, policies based on partial models will typically entail
unanticipated effects that are not known until after the policies are in place.
That is, to a degree all policies are "experiments" with uncertain outcomes.
As actual effects become visible, the conceptual foundations will typically
be reviewed and the feasibility constraints may be altered to allow for
different policy choices. This Part reviews two examples of policies
adopted in the wake of the 1996 Act that illustrate these difficulties of
policy formation and implementation.
A. Unbundling
While the framers of the 1996 Act envisioned the development of
markets for local telephone services populated by numerous competitive
facilities-based carriers, it was recognized that markets such as these could
only develop over time. To bridge that gap, the Act directed the FCC to
design a set of rules that would induce the dominant incumbent carriers to
share their facilities and component services with entrants on terms that
would lead to prices approximating those that theory predicts for
competitive markets served by firms not reliant on competitors for access
to critical inputs. Unbundling rules create possibly conflicting short- and
long-run effects on incumbent service providers and new market entrants.
The net effects of these contradictory incentives were not fully understood
at the time the initial unbundling rules were adopted. Policies favorable to
new entrants will tend to increase short-run entry by new firms but, other
things being equal, slow down facilities upgrades by the incumbent. In
contrast, unbundling rules less favorable to new entrants will, other things
being equal, lead to less short-term market entry but probably enhance
facilities investment by the incumbent. The overall net effect on facilities-
based investment and competition depends on the relative strength of these
short and long-term effects. It will, furthermore, differ depending on
whether a service can be offered using existing facilities (such as voice
service) or whether network upgrades are necessary (such as broadband).
In its Local Competition Order of 1996,11 the FCC focused on voice
services and emphasized short-run efficiency conditions. Thus it specified a
broad list of network elements that had to be unbundled and adopted Total
Element Long-Run Incremental Costs ("TELRIC") as the pricing standard
for unbundled network elements ("UNEs"). In subsequent decisions, the
11. See generally Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 [hereinafter
Local Competition Order].
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agency required that ILECs rebundle these network elements into service
platforms ("UNE-P") that could be used by new entrants to offer voice
services with minimal investment. TELRIC was based on the assumption
that a state-of-the-art-"greenfield"- telecommunications network was in
place. 12 As a result, UNE-P provided functions similar to wholesale voice
services but for substantially less than the wholesale prices which were set
by a retail price minus avoided cost formula based on embedded costs. That
principal framework was expanded to broadband networks when, in 1999,
ILECs were required to unbundle the high-frequency loops necessary to
offer Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL") service. As the costs of the local
loop were recovered in local voice rates, high-frequency loops had to be
made available at very low, and in many jurisdictions even zero, costs. 13
The ILECs challenged the unbundling rules in the courts, leading
to a complicated and prolonged process of continuous policy revision.
Whereas the details of this process cannot be described here, its main
contours can be sketched. 14 In the course of several years, the focus of
unbundling policy shifted from existing voice networks to new broadband
networks. At a conceptual level, this entailed a stronger emphasis on the
dynamic investment incentives of the incumbent service providers rather
than short-term efficiency aspects. Gradually, the view that unbundling had
positive effects on facilities-based investment via the short-term incentives
for new market entry was supplanted by the view that unbundling had
overall negative effects on new facilities deployment because it reduced
incumbent's incentives to invest. This view was corroborated by the
empirical observations that had by then become available, mostly for
narrowband voice markets. By 2004, about 17.8% of all end-user switched
access lines were provided by CLECs. 15 Sixteen and a half percent of the
competitive access lines were based on resale; 57.7% were provided using
unbundled network elements, with the majority within this group based on
UNE-P; and only 25.9% were based on facilities owned by the CLECs.16
Moreover, theoretical research indicated that the TELRIC standard was
12. In this context, a greenfield network refers to the type of network that would be
installed in an area that previously had no telecommunication services, and thus no older
generation infrastructure that might be retrofitted to offer modem, advanced services.
13. See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein & Philip J. Weiser, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE (2005).
14. For a detailed discussion of the developments until February 2005 see Johannes M.
Bauer, Unbundling Policy in the United States: Players, Outcomes and Effects, 57 COMM. &
STRATEGIES, 59-82 (2005) [hereinafter Unbundling Policy].
15. See FCC, Indus. Analysis and Tech. Div.: WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, High-
Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of December 31, 2004 (2005),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/hspd
0705.pdf.
16. See id., Thl 3.
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misleading as it failed to incorporate dynamic investment incentives. 17 As
the new view became accepted as the new conceptual lens through which
unbundling issues were seen, policies were modified accordingly on the
FCC's own initiative and upon pressure from the courts. One key area of
dispute was the interpretation of the "impairment" standard of the 1996
Act.' 8 In USTA 1,'9 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and
remanded the FCC's impairment standard and the list of unbundled
network elements based on it, reasoning that the agency's analysis had not
been sufficiently granular and that it had not considered the costs of
unbundling in the form of reduced investment incentives appropriately. It
further vacated and remanded the line sharing provisions, arguing that the
FCC had not taken competition from other platforms, such as cable,
appropriately into consideration. Partially in response to this decision, the
FCC issued its Triennial Review Order ("Triennial Review"), which
adopted a more stringent impairment standard, retained the unbundling
framework in narrowband voice markets (UNE-L, UNE-P), but eliminated
broadband unbundling requirements by phasing out line sharing over a
three-year period and by exempting new fiber deployments from
unbundling rules altogether. It also delegated the power to promulgate the
more granular rules to the states.
The Triennial Review was again challenged in the courts. In USTA II
(2004), the D.C. Court of Appeals expressly upheld some of its rules,
vacated one rule, and vacated and remanded others. The Triennial Review's
provisions to phase out line sharing and exempt fiber deployments from
unbundling rules were upheld but the delegation of authority to the states
was vacated. Earlier FCC findings of impairment in the mass market for
switching and dedicated transport were vacated and remanded to the
Commission. In a preliminary order in July of 2004,2 1 and a final order in
17. See David M. Mandy & William W. Sharkey, Dynamic Pricing and Investment
from Static Proxy Models (OSP Working Paper Series, Working Paper No 40, 2003)
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-238934A2.pdf; Robert
S. Pindyck, Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in Telecom Networks (MIT
Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4452-03, 2003), available at http://papers.ssm.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=480381.
18. Other contested issues, such as the authority of the FCC to promulgate unbundling
rules and the TELRIC standard were upheld by appeals courts or the U.S. Supreme Court.
See Unbundling Policy, supra note 14 for more details.
19. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter USTA 1].
20. Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978 [hereinafter Triennial Review Order].
21. Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, Order on Reconsideration, 19 F.C.C.R. 20293 (2004).
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February 2005, 22 the FCC found that the mass market for switching was no
longer impaired (thus eliminating UNE-P, which had packaged a local
loop, switching, and transportation). The Commission adopted more
narrowly targeted rules for transportation markets and high-capacity loops,
which have since been challenged in the courts. It also established
transition periods to phase in the new rules, allowing gradual price
increases for services not subject to unbundling any longer. The latest step
in this development came in August 2005, when the FCC declared DSL to
be an information service, not subject to common carriage rules. However,
at the same time, the FCC adopted a general policy statement in favor of
maintaining open access to communication platforms and the Internet. 23 Its
four guiding principles entitle consumers to: (1) access lawful Internet
content of their choice; (2) run applications and use services of their choice
(subject to the needs of law enforcement); (3) connect legal devices of their
choice as long as they do not harm the network; and (4) choose among
competing network, service, and application providers.
The history of unbundling illustrates key points of the co-evolutionary
framework. Under conditions of incomplete information, policies are based
on partial models that are widely accepted as a frame to understand the
nature of the policy problem and the appropriate responses. As information
on the effects of policies becomes available, it needs to be interpreted
(again using partial models) and becomes the basis of corrective action. In
the process, the conceptual foundations underpinning policy may be
improved and refined. However, as the technological and economic
conditions of the industry likely have changed, these improved models
remain incomplete. To be sustainable, policies further need to meet certain
economic viability and political feasibility constraints. All these factors
contribute to deviations of actual policies from optimal policies. Once this
logic of policy formulation and implementation is acknowledged, the
odyssey of unbundling policy appears in a different light, not as policy
failure but as adaptation of the policy system to changing industry
conditions as the knowledge base applied to address the policy problem
grows.
B. Tradeoffs Between Economic and Noneconomic Goals in Media
Policy
While the services offered by the mass media are obviously economic
22. Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 19965 (2004)
[hereinafter Triennial Remand Order].
23. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities; Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 36 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1037 (2005).
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in character, policy interests in media performance are much broader due to
their central roles in the creation and transmission of cultural products, and
perhaps values, and their integration into the very fabric of democratic
political systems. It was thus inevitable that the FCC would have to deal
with tradeoffs between economic and noneconomic goals for media policy
virtually from its inception. The FCC's attempts to balance the economic
and noneconomic societal interests in media performance are perhaps most
visibly reflected in the various regulations governing ownership of
broadcast stations the FCC has crafted over the years. Here the policy
debate has focused on the concern that the level of ownership concentration
claimed necessary by industry interests to realize various economic
efficiencies would reduce, to unacceptable levels, the number of
independent media voices available to promote informed deliberation on
political issues, and that the supply of programming targeted to variously
defined minority audiences would suffer as well. As long as the level of
ownership concentration that best serves societal interests in democratic
deliberation and content diversity is less than that at which media markets
function most efficiently in creating economic value, the growth and
evolution of media industries requires that policymakers constantly refine
ownership policies to reestablish an appropriate balance between efficiency
and diversity goals.
Until the 1996 Act, the trend in broadcast ownership policy had been
one of cautious and incremental relaxation of ownership restrictions as the
number of stations supported by local markets increased along with a
growing population and economy.24 Policies regarding station ownership
were stable for over three decades under the 7-7-7 Rule. The rule limited
the number of broadcast facilities that could be owned by a single entity to
seven TV stations (with a maximum of five VHF stations), and seven each
of FM and AM radio stations, all of which had to be located in separate
geographic markets, except for grandfathered exceptions. The FCC
increased the ownership caps to 12-12-12 in 1985, and in 1992 it raised the
national ownership limits for radio to 18 AMs and 18 FMs, with a
scheduled increase to twenty for each type of station in 1994. The 1996 Act
eliminated entirely any national cap on radio station ownership and
replaced the twelve station cap for television with a rule that limited to 35%
the fraction of the national television audience that could be reached
through stations owned by any single group owner.25 The 1996 Act also
24. See Robert B. Horwitz, On Media Concentration and the Diversity Question, 12
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, 181, 187-90 (2005) (summarizing the history of the FCC's
media ownership rules prior to the 1996 Act).
25. The percent of national audience reachable through a station group's stations is
determined by summing over all the local markets served by its stations the percent of the
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greatly relaxed restrictions on common ownership of radio stations in local
markets, permitting a single owner to control as many as eight stations in
the largest markets. Section 202(h) of the 1996 Act also required the FCC
to revisit its ownership policies every two years to determine whether they
continued to serve the public interest and to make such changes as altered
circumstances dictated were appropriate.
The 2003 Report and Order ("Biennial Regulatory Review")26
reviewed and ordered revisions to six of the Commission's ownership rules
and was by far the FCC's most ambitious attempt to respond to this
congressional mandate. Perhaps the most notable and controversial feature
of the Order was the FCC's announcement of its new diversity index
("DI"). The DI was consciously patterned after the Herfindahl-Hirschmann
Index ("HHI") employed by the antitrust authorities to evaluate merger
applications. Like the HHI, the DI was to serve as a numerical measure of
market concentration based on shares of the market controlled by
participating media firms and public broadcasters. Antitrust authorities use
a market's HHI as a starting point in assessing the relationship between a
market's structure and its performance with respect to the efficiency goals
of antitrust policy. The DI was intended to serve a similar role in helping
media policy officials assess the connection between the ownership
structure of the much more broadly defined "diversity" markets 27 and
assess their performance with respect to the various diversity goals of
communications policy. In substantial part, the DI was the FCC's attempt
to respond to a series of legal setbacks, in which the Commission's
arguments that rules on media hiring practices and ownership served the
public interest in content diversity were rejected by the courts for failure to
demonstrate a convincing empirical nexus between the policy in question
national audience residing in these markets. Because UHF stations have weaker signals than
VHF stations, they are credited with reaching only a fraction of the audience in each market
they serve. Thus, a group owner with UHF stations can serve markets with more than 35%
of the national audience before hitting the statutory cap.
26. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
18 F.C.C.R. 13620 (2003), affd in part and remanded in part, Prometheus Radio Project v.
FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004) (remanding the FCC's cross-media ownership limits
decisions for justification or modification), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 2904 (2005).
27. Two or more products may be included in the same economic market if they are
sufficiently close substitutes in demand. Two or more media that are not sufficiently close
demand substitutes to be included in the same antitrust market may be included in a
common "diversity market" for which a DI might be calculated if they satisfy the FCC's
criterion that media consumers rely on them substantially for coverage of local news and
public affairs.
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and the diversity goal it was purportedly intended to serve.28
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Prometheus to
remand the DI and other-but not all-elements of the Biennial Regulatory
Review to the FCC was a resounding defeat. While offering many
criticisms of the FCC's arguments in support of the DI, the crux of the
court's finding was that the DI suffered from problems of both internal
consistency and external validity because the FCC did not have a
methodology that it consistently applied to determine which media to
include in the index, the weights assigned different media by the index, and
the market shares the index assigned to different outlets that were of the
same medium.29 Referring to the decision to assign all broadcast stations of
a given type (e.g., radio or television) identical shares, the court stated that
"there is no dispute that the assignment of equal market shares generates
absurd results." 3° Looking deeper, it is apparent that the failings the court
identified in the FCC's attempt to create an index that would reflect a
media market's structural proclivities to contribute to the diversity of
viewpoints available to its citizens stem from an underdeveloped
conceptual and empirical foundation that proved to be wholly inadequate
for the task.
Ownership policy to this point had evolved through a series of fairly
small incremental steps, each of which represented a politically viable
compromise in response to the increased economic and diversity potential
inherent in the growing numbers of broadcast outlets and the emergence of
new media. While announcements of new policies were always cloaked in
the language of the public interest and while it might plausibly be argued
that the long-run trajectory of these adjustments was one of improved
performance with respect to both the diversity and the efficiency goals of
communications policy, such a claim certainly could not have been
supported by any empirical measure of performance with respect to either
type of goal. By no stretch of the imagination could it be said that new
ownership policies were produced through application of a welfare calculus
employed to identify new policy optima. The calculus simply did not exist.
While the definition of economic surplus that would presumably be central
to the efficiency component of such a calculus was conceptually clear and
in principle measurable, the same could not be said for diversity. As
historically used in communications policy, the term "diversity" has several
28. Horwitz, supra note 24, at 193-96 (providing an overview of these decisions).
29. See Steven S. Wildman, Indexing Diversity, in MEDIA DIVERsrrY AND LOCALISM:
MEANING AND METRICS (Philip M. Napoli, ed., forthcoming) (on file with Authors).
30. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 408 (3rd Cir. 2004).
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distinct meanings.31 Unfortunately, for none of these meanings is there a
clear connection to a plausible measure of the efficacy of a democratic
system of government. As Horwitz observes, "the meaning of diversity was
always problematic and undertheorized."
32
Given the weak conceptual foundations for the diversity concept and
its meaning as a goal for communications policy, the FCC's setbacks with
the Biennial Regulatory Review are understandable. For radio, especially,
the relaxation of ownership rules under the 1996 Act was a break from the
incrementalism of prior adjustments. The elimination of national caps and
relaxation of limits on the size of local station groups unleashed a process
of rapid industry consolidation. That consolidation elevated ownership
concentration to levels well outside the comfort zone even of many
observers who had taken a pro-industry stance on earlier adjustments. It
also turned out that the 35% audience cap on television station ownership
set by the Act of 1996 was close to the maximum Congress would tolerate.
Both houses of Congress responded to the Commission's proposal in the
Biennial Regulatory Review to raise the national television audience cap to
45% with bills re-establishing the 35% limit. Under threat of veto by
President Bush, they eventually settled on 39%. So changes initiated by
Congress pushed the FCC into uncharted territory in which it was difficult
to gauge the political repercussions of further adjustments to its ownership
rules. Furthermore, the charge to the Commission to periodically review its
ownership rules also required that it justify both proposed changes and
decisions to retain the status quo. This laid bare the fact it had no cohesive
framework with which to structure the supporting analyses. During this
same period, the FCC found that it was unable to successfully defend itself
against legal challenges to its attempts to change policies linked to various
diversity goals because the courts found it had not credibly established a
nexus between the challenged rules and the diversity benefits they were
supposed to secure.33
The FCC responded with a set of studies that were to provide the
analytical foundation for a wholesale review of its ownership rules. The
end result was the Biennial Regulatory Review and the DI used to justify
many of the announced changes to its rules. While the effort itself might be
lauded, the goal was unattainable. The thinking that underlay the HHI
reflected decades of sharply focused scholarship and enforcement
experience. As a result, there was widespread agreement on the efficiency
31. Philip M. Napoli, FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND
PROCESS IN TmE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA 128-48 (2001) (on file with Authors).
32. Horwitz, supra note 23, at 181 (quoted from abstract).
33. Id. at 193-96.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
goals of merger policy, a strong theoretical foundation for the belief that
beyond a certain point a market's performance would suffer as ownership
concentration increased, and a body of empirical work by economists that
provided justification for associating specific values of the HHI with
certain expectations for a market's performance. By contrast, diversity
itself remains a vaguely defined concept and there is no obvious measure of
performance with respect to the goal of improving the efficacy of
democratic institutions that diversity is supposed to serve. The upshot is
that the DI, a measure of market structure, cannot be grounded in a measure
of performance. The FCC's efforts, while notable, could not make up for
the gaps in the pre-existing research.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR A REDESIGN OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW
Looking forward, the question arises as to how a sustainable legal
framework for communications could be designed. This Part discusses
several approaches that have been suggested in the recent past, but finds
most of them lacking in some respect. We then proceed to outline a more
process-oriented approach that takes explicit account of the co-evolutionary
nature of policy, technology, and performance.
A. Rethinking the Role of Communications Policy, Law, and
Regulation
At a fundamental level, communications law should express the basic
principles of communications policy. The policy debate of the past decades
has narrowly construed policy as a correction for situations in which
private ordering of decentralized decisions does not yield efficient
outcomes. This includes the classical cases of market failure in the
presence of externalities and public good characteristics, missing property
rights that prevent private ordering, and the presence of uncontrolled
market power. This approach overlooks that policy also defines the broader
framework within which private ordering arrangements exist. Even if all
forms of market failure were addressed, society faces choices as to which
principles should govern communications. In practice, markets are
embedded in and constituted by numerous formal and informal institutional
arrangements. Some of the guiding principles, such as the freedom of
speech, may be embedded in constitutional law and are subject only to
gradual modification. Others reside at the level of statutory law and hence,
are subject to a shorter cycle of debate and review. Good examples are the
media diversity rules discussed above and universal service policies.
Private ordering may address these issues but it is not clear a priori that the
outcome would be superior to one shaped by public policy.
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Moreover, the outcomes of unfettered market forces may be
considered unacceptable or wanting, for example, if they result in an
undesirable distribution of costs and benefits. Such "market deficiency"
does not only refer to distributional issues but also to broader aspects of
communications policy, such as the arrangements governing decision
making in this area and rights of individuals to access communication
services and information. Moreover, it includes actions by the public sector
that facilitate market processes, such as standardization, innovation, and
research and development ("R&D"), that are often disparaged in the United
States as "industrial policy." Whereas it may be difficult to specify the
conditions for success of these policies, they are, nonetheless, important as
policy experiments, and nations who pursue them may be able to reap
benefits. In our view, it is this latter aspect of public policy that needs
broader debate and reflection. Market forces are compatible with a broad
set of institutional arrangements, ranging from a pure laissez faire approach
to markets more strongly controlled by government or other collective
actors. It is not evident that one form or another is superior overall, as has
been illustrated by a rich body of research in institutional economics.
34
Rather, different institutional arrangements will lead to different
trajectories, different combinations of static and dynamic performance
characteristics-including the prices charged for communication services,
the diversity of services available, the rate at which new services are
introduced to the market, and the ubiquity of access to services and content.
As the ranking of different policy frameworks will depend on the weights
attached to these performance characteristics, no preferred framework can
be identified without a clear specification of these weights.
Not all the institutional arrangements that define this mix are designed
by purposive action, as some emerge from the repeated interaction of
individuals and organizations. This is possible in areas subject to private
ordering, such as unlicensed spectrum, but also in areas with strong public
policy involvement such as the unbundling and media ownership cases
discussed above. In that former instance, the overall path of unbundling
policy may be seen as emergent from multiple smaller purposive actions of
actors with different advantages in political clout and market power, and
not the pursuit of an initial master plan for an unbundling regime. In the
latter case, it seems clear that policymakers were caught off guard by the
strength of the forces for ownership consolidation unleashed by the 1996
Act and are still seeking ways to respond to an altered industry landscape.
34. See, e.g., DOUGLASS N. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE (2005); ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DpvERSrrY (2005) (on
file with Authors).
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Thus, deliberative public policy can only control part of the institutional
arrangements that make up the governance structure of communications.
Policy can shape, but rarely fully determine, the future direction of the
sector and its performance.
Important, but as yet poorly understood, changes in the ability of
deliberate policy to control the overall direction of the sector are associated
with the transition from monopoly to a more open, competitive framework.
For example, Wildman lists eleven critical questions that should be
addressed (but largely have not) in constructing an index that might assist
in balancing the market efficiency and diversity goals of media policy in
ownership rules.35 Bauer points out that "policy was better able to control
important performance characteristics, such as prices or investment levels,
during the past monopoly era. However, the ability to control came at the
price of the inefficiencies associated with monopoly organization." 36 In
contrast, in the present competitive framework, many feasible policy
instruments, such as unbundling rules or other forms of regulation of
wholesale aspects of communication markets, affect sector performance
only indirectly. Overall sector performance becomes an emergent property
resulting from decentralized decisions in markets, in addition to, though
somewhat outside, the direct control of regulation and policy.
37
Performance is influenced but not fully determined by policy choices.
Unexpected consequences, which could be treated as correctable
aberrations in the monopoly system, become more common and force
policy to continuously adapt. Such an understanding of a dynamic, but in
many ways more limited role of policy-as one important factor among
others-is critical when conceptualizing the future role of communications
law. As public policy and private ordering have their respective costs, the
appropriate normative question is to find the mix of (imperfect) collective
policy arrangements and (imperfect) private ordering that yield the highest
aggregate welfare, given the overall vision for the sector.
B. From Outcome to Process-Oriented Policy
Both the 1934 and 1996 Acts contain outcome-oriented and
procedural provisions. Nonetheless, in the statutes and particularly in the
regulations based upon those statutes, outcome-oriented provisions
dominate. For the reasons discussed in this Essay, and as demonstrated by
35. Wildman, supra note 29.
36. See Johannes M. Bauer, Harnessing the Swarm: Communications Policy in an Era
of Ubiquitous Networks and Disruptive Technologies, 54 COMM. & STRATEGIES 19 (2004).
37. This is true for many other areas of public policy, such as monetary policy or fiscal
policy. In these areas, the implications have been studied more fully and policy instruments
are designed with that knowledge in mind.
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the developments after the passage of the 1996 Act, such an approach is
unlikely to yield a sustainable framework. Several specific proposals have
been made for the basic features of a more appropriate and durable legal
framework. Before we conclude this Essay with our own suggestions, we
will briefly review a few important aspects of selected proposals. One of
the common problems identified by these proposals is the industry-specific
(sometimes referred as "stovepipe" or "silo") architecture of the 1996 Act.
Although several measures made the strict segmentation of the 1934 Act
more porous (e.g., cable-telco cross entry, entry of utilities into telecoms),
it retained separate titles for the common carrier, broadcasting, cable, and
information services segments of the industry, with industries such as
wireless communications straddling several of these titles. Another
problem is that regulation is only partially integrated with principles of
antitrust and competition policy. Consequently, many proposals are aimed
at fixing these flaws. However, with few exceptions, problems associated
with the governance of large technical systems, as discussed in our Essay,
are largely unrecognized.
Scholars in law, economics, and communications, among others, have
discussed design options for communications law and a full review would
exceed the scope of this contribution. Concerns about different regulatory
models for the different segments of communications were raised since the
1970s and 1980s.38 Longstaff attempted to develop an integrated
framework based on information theory and the general model of
communications process developed by Shannon. In this original scheme,
legal principles could thus be developed for senders, channels, receivers,
and messages, relatively independent of the technology used to enable the
communication. 39  More recently, Sidak and Spulber, integrating
suggestions made by several others, proposed three principles for the
design of a framework enabling the evolution of fair and efficient
competition: (1) No service provider should be burdened with regulatory
service obligations (economic incentive principle); (2) Incumbent players
and new entrants should be allowed to pursue the same kinds of business
strategies (e.g., price differentiation or diversification) (equal opportunity
principle); and (3) Regulations should be technologically and competitively
neutral and apply to all market participants in the same way (impartiality
38. See, e.g., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983) (expressing
concern that the application of broadcasting regulation to information services would
undermine the freedom of speech).
39. See Patricia Hirl Longstaff, Regulating Communications in the 21' Century: New
Common Ground, in THE INFORMATION RESOURCES HANDBOOK: RESEARCH FOR THE
INFORMATION AGE 453 (Benjamin M. Compaine & William H. Read, eds., 1999).
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principle). 40
Based on similar reasoning, several authors have suggested that a
horizontal, layered legal model would be more appropriate to the
challenges facing communication industries. In this approach, different
layers, such as the physical network, the logical addressing and signaling
infrastructure, services and applications, and content are distinguished, and
legal and regulatory measures are targeted to them, independent of the
technological solution.4 1 The new European regulatory framework, in
effect since July 2003, is strongly inspired by such a horizontal design
principle. However, there are reasons to believe that, while a horizontal
approach will better reflect the actual structure and operation of today's
communication industries, the seemingly clear horizontal layer structure of
IP networks will be replaced by yet other, perhaps hybrid forms.
42
Therefore, despite its apparent advantages over the present model,
establishing a horizontal framework may not be a long-term sustainable
strategy either.
When the 1996 Act was passed, there was great hope that robust
competition would emerge in access networks. Ten years later it is obvious
that the predictions of skeptics who anticipated the emergence of an
oligopoly structure have more accurately anticipated the actual
developments. For some time to come, local access markets will best be
characterized as duopolies with a competitive fringe composed of wireless,
satellite, and powerline service providers. The incentives of network
owners under such market conditions are ambiguous. Whereas, under some
conditions platform owners will have incentives to voluntarily sell access
to their platforms to competing service providers, there are also conditions
for which this conclusion does not hold.43 In response to these concerns,
which are particularly pertinent in a broadband environment in which many
innovations and services are offered at the higher levels of the network and
thus dependent on platform access, several scholars have promoted a "net
40. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition
in Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117 (1998).
41. See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications
Policy (OPP Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 29, 1997), available at http://www.
fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp29.pdf; Martin Fransman, Mapping the
Evolving Telecoms Industry: The Uses and Shortcomings of the Layer Model, 26
TELECOMM. POL. 473 (2002).
42. See David D. Clark, Open Access, Paper Presented at the Georgetown University
Symposium: Must History Repeat Itself? Interoperability and Access in the Network
Economy (Oct. 12, 2005).
43. See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HAR. J. OF L. & TECH. 85 (2003).
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neutrality" model, in which certain minimal standards are in place that
prevent incumbents from abusing their control of access to ultimate
customers in an anticompetitive fashion.44 It is not yet fully worked out
how net neutrality would be implemented, but it does not necessarily imply
an intrusive aproach, or the mandating of a "dumb pipe" as some of its
critics imply. It is possible that minimal principles of nondiscrimination
and a process to quickly address complaints of violations may be
developed. Such an approach would have potential advantages over an
antitrust framework, which risks lengthy legal proceedings. At an aggregate
level, recent observations of the innovation patterns in Southeast Asia and
in Europe seem to lend some support to the claim that safeguards against
platform closure may have positive net effects on innovation.
Recently, the Digital Age Communications Act Project, organized by
the Progress and Freedom Foundation, attempted to develop a
comprehensive blueprint for future communications law.4 6 As the project's
output has inspired a Senate Bill, it shall be discussed in slightly more
detail.47 Most pertinent for our discussion is the proposal by the regulatory
framework working group. Given convergence and the emergence of
multiple service providers, the report proposes to base communications
policy on principles of competition law. A regulatory agency would largely
work via adjudication as cases emerge, rather than through an "elaborate
web of rules and regulations."'4 8 This approach is modeled after the Federal
Trade Commission, which was designed to operate in this manner. In
addition, a communications regulatory agency would be empowered to
mandate interconnection "in situations where markets are not adequately
providing interconnection and in which the denial of interconnection would
substantially harm consumer welfare.' 49 Lastly, the report acknowledges
the need for a transition period. All these features have merit and might
result in a sustainable framework for communications policy. However, the
44. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. OF TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2005).
45. See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
(2005); Adam Thierer, Are "Dumb Pipe" Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical
Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. OF TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 275 (2003).
46. The project comprised working groups addressing the following issues: regulatory
framework, spectrum policy, institutional reform, universal service/social policy, and on the
federal/state framework. See http://www.pff.org/daca/ (archiving the proposals drafted by
the working groups).
47. See Digital Age Communications Act of 2005, S. 2113, 109th Cong. (2005).
48. See The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Proposal of the Regulatory Framework
Working Group 3 (2005), http://www.pff.org/issues pubs/other/050617regframework.pdf.
49. Id. at 4.
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approach might be criticized for construing the role of policy too narrowly,
as simply an adjudication of competition issues, and for not properly
recognizing that policy sets the overarching framework within which
markets and competition arise. This broader framework defines the
fundamental vision for the communication industries and is thus of critical
importance. At the time of writing, the project's social policy
recommendations were not yet available, and they may address some of
these broader issues. The view emerging from the "Regulatory
Framework" proposal of the Digital Age Communication Act Project is one
of unfettered competition. Whether the assumption that competition will
outperform any other type of arrangement in promoting the proper goals of
communications policy is correct will only be revealed as experience
accumulates.
V. WAYS FORWARD
If law, technology, sector organization, and performance are seen
from a co-evolutionary perspective, their close interdependence is
recognized. Policy is not only an instrument to correct for forms of market
failure and resolve competitive disputes. Rather, it shapes the future
development of communication markets in more fundamental ways. Good
policy needs to recognize these dynamic interactions and use comparative
analytical tools that allow anticipating and simulating different sets of rules
and their implications. None of the proposals reviewed in the previous
section meet this requirement. The most important role of a policy is to
define the overall framework for the sector: the rights and obligations of
the stakeholders and processes for settling conflicts. Market forces and
competition unfold within these general rules-the constitution of the
market. The specific provisions of this constitution should be tied to their
effects on the overall performance of the sector and be subject to periodic
review. In the new environment of communication industries, it is this
constitutional level at which communications policy probably will have the
most lasting effect. At the level of more specific rules and regulations,
policies will have a more indirect relation to overall sector performance.
Competitive and technological neutrality are in principle desirable features
but they may not always make sense nor be easy to operationalize. At this
level, policy ideally would be flexible and adaptive to changing
circumstances. Private ordering with an adjudicatory role for a regulatory
agency might meet this goal well, but this should not be taken as a given.
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